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CONDILLAC.
(1715-1780.)
MY PROF. L. LfeVV-BRUHL.
IN order to characterise Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclo-
pedists, from the point of view of philosophy, the Germans
often use a rather significant phrase. They call them philosophers
/ur die Welt, popularisers. They consider them quite as desirous
of spreading their doctrines among the public as of testing them
thoroughly. But was there not one among them, or very near
them, with whom the speculative interest stood foremost, a philos-
opher without any qualification and in the strictest sense of the
word, a thinker, in fact, who joined together into a system the body
of the philosophical ideas which prevailed in the latter half of the
eighteenth century?
This demand was met by Abb6 de Condillac. He was, as he
has been called, the ''philosophers' philosopher." Being loved
and admired by most of them, he was for some time a contributor
to the Encyclopc'die. He made a long stay in Italy, as tutor to
the son of the Duke of Parma, and then returned to France and
lived peacefully in the country, apart from literary and philosoph-
ical quarrels. He never appeared at the French Academy except
on the day when he made his inaugural address. Yet he was per-
sonally acquainted with nearly all the distinguished men of the
time, and the continual succession of his published works did not
permit the public to forget him. These works were numerous and
bulky, from the Essai sur rOrigine des Connaissances Hiimaines
(1746), in which many of the ideas which he was to develop later
on were already sketched, down to the Langue des Calculs, which
did not appear until after his death. He touched not only upon
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every phase of philosophy proper, but also upon pedagogy, gram-
mar, history, political economy and social science, the most orig-
inal portion of all this considerable body of work being that on the
theory of knowledge.
Condillac proposed studying the human mind, not as a meta-
physician, but as a psychologist and a logician ; not in order to dis-
cover the nature of it, but to understand its operations. He wished
to observe the art with which they are combined, and how we are
to manage them in order to acquire as much intelligence as we are
capable of receiving ; and, therefore, he wished to trace back the
origin of our ideas, to discover their birth, to follow them as far
as the limits set them by nature, and in this way to " determine the
extent and boundaries of our knowledge and to renovate the human
understanding altogether."
Condillac's leading idea therefore is derived from Locke, but
not from Locke only. Hostile as he was to innate ideas and Car-
tesian metaphysics, there is in him clearly something of the Carte-
sian spirit. Locke had inquired chiefly into the contents of the
human mind ; Condillac endeavored to construct a system. He
sought an "unassailable first principle, sufficient to explain all the
rest." He sought it, it is true, in the primitive data of the senses,
whereas Descartes had found it in the intuition of thought; but
the opposition between their doctrines does not exclude a certain
analogy in their conceptions of the proper method.
Condillac never concealed his indebtedness to Locke, but his
estimate of the philosophy of his predecessor varied. In his first
work he seems to follow him faithfully and to recognise, as Locke
did, two sources to our ideas : sensation and reflexion. Later on,
when more thoroughly master of his own thought, he asserted sen-
sation to be the only source of our ideas. He considers Locke to
have erred in not carrying the analysis far enough. Locke did not
realise how indispensable it is that we should learn how to feel, see,
hear, etc. All the faculties of the soul he thought to be innate qual-
ities, and he did not suspect that they might possibly originate in
sensation itself. He thought that we naturally make use of our
senses by a sort of instinct. Most of the judgments which are min-
gled with our sensations escaped him. In one word, it was in the
very name of empiricism that Condillac criticised Locke's empiri
cism. It is not sufficient to reduce the whole of our knowledge to
sentient knowledge. We must show how this sentient knowledge
is produced, resolve it into its elements, and show how these ele-
ments can account for every form of activity in the human soul.
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Let then our starting-point be sensation, isolated by analysis
and separated—or at least Condillac thought it so—from all judg-
ments mingled with it. This sensation does not bring us out of
ourselves. It merely consists in a modification of consciousness
which may be keen or weak, pleasurable or painful ; but it teaches
us nothing of what is outside ourselves, or even whether anything
exists outside ourselves. This would be true as regards all our
sensations, if we had not touch. The sensations of touch have the
singular property of suggesting to us the idea of objects distinct
from ourselves. They are at the same time feelings and ideas:
feelings in their relation to the soul which they modif}', ideas in
their connexion with some outward thing. Being accustomed to
ascribe all the sensations of the sense of touch to external objects,
we fall into like habits with our other senses. Thus our sensations
become objective; they appear to us no longer as modifications of
the state of the ego, but as qualities of bodies around us. They
have become ideas.
Let us now suppose a sensation more vivid than others to
force itself upon our consciousness so powerfully as to throw all
others, at least temporarily, into the shade : this exclusive sensa-
tion will be what we call attention. But attention may just as well
be directed to a past sensation, which recurs again to the mind, a-;
to a present sensation. Memory is therefore nothing but a trans
formed sensation. We are thus capable of a twofold kind of atten-
tion, exercised on the one hand by memory, on the other by the
present sensation. Once given a twofold kind of attention, and
there results comparison; for, attending to two ideas and compar-
ing them are one and the same thing. Now, we cannot compare
them without perceiving some difference or resemblance between
them. To perceive such relations is to perform an act of judg-
ment. Thus does sensation, as it undergoes transformations, be-
come successively attention, memory, comparison, and judgment.
Having reached this point we have explained the whole of human
understanding, which is, in fact, nothing but a collection or com-
bination of the operations of the soul.
By looking upon sensations as representative we have ob-
served that all our ideas and the faculties of our understanding
issue from them. Now if we consider them with regard to their
pleasurable or painful character, we shall behold the birth of all
the operations usually ascribed to the will. Condillac lays it down
as a principle that there are no neutral sensations, but that each of
them gives us either pleasure or pain, and makes us inclined to
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continue it or to escape it. Were it not for this property of our
sensations, intellectual activity would not be aroused,—attention
and memory, and therefore understanding, would be left undevel-
oped. But nature has made us very sensible of the relative char-
acter of the sensations that affect us. We cannot be uncomfortable,
or less comfortable than we have been before, without comparing
our present state with the states we have formerly been in ; and
this comparison makes us feel some uneasiness, or disquiet, and as
soon as there is added to this the idea of the object we think likely
to contribute to our happiness, the action of our faculties is deter-
mined in the direction of this object. This is what we call desire.
But from desire spring passions: love, hatred, hope, fear, volition.
Again, all these are but transformed sensations.
In order to illustrate his theory, Condillac, in his Traite des
Sefisations, had recourse to the celebrated fiction of an animated
statue, shaped internally like ourselves, in which he awakens the
senses in succession, beginning with smell and ending with touch.
Next we see the faculties of the soul springing one after another
from the progressive transformations of sensation. Similar fictions
are to be found in Diderot and Buffon, which is sufficient to prove
that they suited the taste of their contemporaries and answered
their idea of the development of the mind. To-day, on the con-
trary, we are chifly struck by the artificial and arbitrary character
of such a supposition. We see in it an involuntary confession of
the fact that his theory of knowledge proceeds in a purely abstract
way.
Yet it would be unfair to condemn their doctrine summarily on
that account. It is with Condillac as with many other French phi-
losophers of his time, between whose minds and his there was evi-
dent affinity. The solutions he unhesitatingly proposes are hasty
and often rash ; the problems he sets and the general method he
indicates for their solution are highly interesting. In his theory of
transformed sensation, Condillac seeks to account for the evolution
of the human mind by starting from an irreducible "first fact."
As Buffon tried to explain the genesis of our solar system, as Rous-
seau sought afterwards to explain the genesis of society, Condillac
endeavors to trace back the genesis of the faculties of the human
mind. On the way he notices many interesting psychological
facts. He shows the part played by the association of ideas, which
causes us to look upon notions that are really acquired and com-
plex as being natural and simple ; he sees that the association of
ideas is a particular case of habit. And thus the task of the phi-
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losopher, according to Condillac, consists chifly in dissociating,
by means of analysis, the elements which habit has joined together
so closely that we can no longer see where they are welded to-
gether.
Analysis, therefore, does not stop where reflexion and memory
can separate or resolve no further. It is true, we have a tendency
to believe that part of our knowledge is born with us. But this is
because we can remember a time when we did not know a given
thing only in case we can remember having learned it ; and, in
order to be conscious of learning we must know something already.
How then could we remember having learned to see, hear, or
touch? And yet it is certain that we have learned these things.
Consequently, we are driven to suppose that to be innate the ac-
quisition of which we cannot otherwise account for. All the rest
is the product of experience. For instance, if some faculty hap-
pens to be perfected (as the judgment of distance by sight), it is
therefore acquired; it was in its beginning, at a time beyond the
reach of our memory, a first improvement upon some earlier state.
Condillac applied to psychology Pascal's well-known saying : "Na-
ture itself is only a first habit, as habit is a second nature."
From these principles naturally follows the theor}' of instinct.
We can distinguish two "selves" in every man: the self of habit
and the self of reflexion. "The self of reflexion is its own master,
and is conscious of its own operations while performing them. It
endeavors to know or reach the objects which it has in view, and
which it may give up for other objects when it pleases. The "self
of habit " acts in a reflex way, so to speak, without the interven-
tion of consciousness being needed. It touches, it sees, and it di-
rects the animal faculties ; it guides and preserves the body. If
we suppress in a grown-up man the "self of reflexion," the "self
of habit" which remains suffices for such needs as are absolutely
necessary for the preservation of the animal. Instinct is nothing
but habit minus reflexion. But, Condillac adds immediately after,
it is by reflecting that beasts acquire it. As they have but few
wants, a time soon comes when they have done all that reflexion
can teach them. They daily repeat the same actions, and their
habits become automatic.
Yet does not instinct often appear to be innate and hereditary ?
— It does, says Condillac, but it is not so; for we find it subject to
improvement; now, whatever is subject to improvement is ac-
quired. All these consequences are most logically inferred from
Condillac's own principles. Therefore he had a right to answer
262 THE OPEN COURT.
those who reproached him with having drawn his inspiration from
the celebrated passage in which Buffon represents man awakening
to life and admiring nature around him: "Monsieur de Buffon
supposes his imaginary man to possess in the beginning habits
which he ought to have had him acquire." To treat as acquired
habits faculties which appear to be most inherent in our nature, is
Condillac's favorite maxim. We all know how it prospered in the
present century. It was one of the ruling principles of psycholog}',
as long as the philosophy of association was in favor, in England
as well as in France.
The sum of our reflexions over and above our habits consti-
tutes our reason. But language is necessary for the development
of reason. Were our thought limited to the representation of
individual and concrete objects and unable to form abstract and
general ideas, it would remain forever in a rudimentary state.
Now such ideas are simply denominations and designations of
classes. For instance, the idea of "animal" connotes characteris-
tics common to man, the lion, the horse, and the totality of ani-
mals, and these characteristics only. This idea I can fix only with
the help of the word which expresses it. We see therefore how in-
dispensable words are to us. But for them, there would be no ab-
stract ideas. Had we no abstract ideas, we should liave neither
genera nor species, and had we neither genera nor species, we
could not reason upon anything. To speak, to reason, to form
general or abstract ideas, are at bottom one and the same thing.
Therefore, to communicate thought is not the only function of
language. Whenever man thinks, even though he should not ex-
press his thought outwardly, he speaks. This has been called "in-
ward language." The "first advantage " of language, according
to Condillac, is to separate thought into its elements by means of
a series of signs which successively represent the same. Whenever
I reason, all the ideas which constitute this reasoning are present
in my mind at once. I should not be able either to enter upon the
reasoning or to bring it to a close if the series of judgments of
which it is composed were not grasped all together by my mind.
It is not, therefore, by speaking that I judge and reason, and
tiiese operations of the mind necessarily precede discourse. But
discourse is a real analysis which resolves these complex opera-
tions and separates their successive stages. It leads the mind
from one thought to another, and from one discovery to another.
The more limited the faculty of thinking is in one who does not
analyse his own thoughts, and who, in consequence, does not ob-
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serve all that he does while thinking, the further this faculty must
reach in one who does analyse his thoughts and observes even
their minutest details.
Consequently, "the art of reasoning is equivalent to the art of
speaking." In this sense well-constructed language is akin to well-
constructed science. Nearly all our errors originate in defects or
misuse of our language. If we treat abstractions as realities, that
is, if we mistake for a thing actually existing what is merely the
designation of an assemblage of qualities, is not that a misuse of
language? How often do we make use of words before we have
determined their meaning, and even without having felt the need
of determining it ! Such confusion in language necessarily implies
confusion in thought. Error thus begets error, and language lends
itself no less easily to false systems than to true analysis.
There is then but one way of restoring order to the faculty of
thinking, and that is to forget all that we have learned, to return
to the origin of our ideas, to follow them as they develop, and, as
Bacon says, to make over the human understanding. "Go back
to nature," is Condillac's motto, as it was also to be that of Rous-
seau. Error is our own doing. We think and speak erron;:ousl}',
and therefore we blunder; but we have only ourselves to blame.
The spirit of the rising generation is modelled after that of the pre-
ceding one, and erroneous systems are handed down together with
the languages which are their vehicles. Such are the effects of
bad education, and education is bad only inasmuch as it is con-
trary to nature. "Nature has begun all things, and always aright:
this truth cannot be repeated too often."
We imagine that languages would be more perfect if they were
the work of philosophers, which is a serious mistake. The lan-
guages of the sciences (algebra excepted) have no advantage over
other languages. According to Condillac, the earliest vulgar lan-
guages must have been the best fitted for reasoning. The devel-
opment of the ideas and faculties of the soul must have been per-
ceptible in these languages, in which the first acceptation of each
word was still known, and in which analogy supplied all the others.
They were transparent things, so to speak, through which one
could watch the progress of the composition of thought. Their
syntax was crystallised logic, and the science of the mind thus
spontaneously revealed itself in the structure of language. " Sound
metaphysics began before languages, and they owe to it their best
qualities. But this metaphysics was then not so much a science as
an instinct. It was nature guiding men without their knowing it.
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and metaphysics became a science only after it had ceased to be
sound."
* *
*
There is therefore, according to Condillac, a natural method
which is the soul of language and science. If we followed it prop-
erly, it would lead us infallibly to truth. This method he calls
"analysis." In his first work, he contented himself with saying
that analysis consists merely in combining and separating our ideas
in order to make different comparisons and thus to discover their
mutual relation and the new ideas to which they may give rise.
This analysis is "the secret of discoveries" because it always takes
us back to the origin of things. " It consists," he says again, "in
tracing our ideas back to their origin, and in studying their develop-
ment."
We see even by these definitions, that in Condillac's analysis
thought is not opposed to synthesis as decomposition is to compo
sition. It comprehends both processes ; there is no reasoning
which is not a succession of compositions and decompositions, and
the two operations are inseparable. Yet the distinction between
analysis and synthesis subsists in Condillac, but in a special sense.
To proceed analytically, in his view, is to start from the simple,
the primitive, and the particular, proceeding with the help of
observation and experience, and reproducing the "development"
of things. To proceed synthetically is to start from general and
abstract principles, aiming thence to deduce the particular and the
concrete,—an ambitious and faulty method which has too often led
metaphysicians astray.
If our minds were powerful enough to perceive distinctly, at
one glance, a collection of objects or all the qualities of an object
and the connexions between these, we should have no need of
analysis. Our knowledge would be intuitive and perfect from the
first. But it is not so ; we first have collective impressions, and in
order to transform these into knowledge we must decompose
them. We therefore consider one after another the objects which
form part of a whole, and compare them in order to judge of their
mutual connexion. When we have thus become acquainted with
their respective positions, we observe in succession all those that
fill the intervals ; we compare each of them with the nearest prin-
cipal object and thus we determine its position. In this way we
make out all the objects, the form and situation of which we have
discovered, and take them all in at one glance. The order assigned
to them in our mind is no longer successive, it has become simul-
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taneous. It is the order in which the objects really are situated,
and we perceive them all at once distinctly ; whence this specific
definition of analysis: "To analyze is simply to observe in succes-
sive order the qualities of an object, in order to assign to them in
the mind the simiiltaiieous order m which they exist."
But there are many ways of conceiving this successive order
that leads to a view, both simultaneous and distinct, of the rela-
tions between objects ; can it be said that any one of these many
is the pre-eminently analytical order? "The whole difficulty,"
says Condillac, " consists in finding how to begin in order to ap-
prehend ideas in their most essential connexion with one another.
I assert that the only combination by which this is to be found is
the one which is in accordance with the very genesis of things.
We must start from the first idea which must have produced all
others." The analytical order is the genetic order. If we knew a
sufficient number of facts, and had studied them closely enough,
systems would in some sort be self made, as facts would group
themselves of their own accord in such an order as to explain one
another in succession. We should then find that in every system
there is a first fact, which is the beginning of it, and which for this
reason might be called the principle, for principle and beginning
are two words which have originally the same meaning. Any system
which does not thus exactly reproduce the order of the evolution
and composition of facts, any system resting on general and ab-
stract principles is arbitrary, and consequently false. The logical
order of science coincides with the order in which phenomena are
produced in the course of time. In one word, in this empirical
conception of analysis the mind is methodically made subordinate
to things. It is in things that order is inherent, and the function
of the mind consists in reflecting back this order as faithfully as
possible, and in being, to use Bacon's expression, a perfect mirror.
The stumbling-block to empiricism of this kind is generally to
be found in mathematics and metaphysics. As regards mathemat-
ics, Condillac got out of the difficulty by reducing every demon-
stration to a succession of equivalent propositions "the identity of
which is obvious," and is more easily perceived when we use alge-
braical signs. Nor was metaphysics embarrassing to Condillac, no
doubt because he took but little care to make it fit in with the rest
of his system. He proves dogmatically the existence of God from
the necessity of a first cause and from the existence of final causes.
We again meet in him the argument of the watch and the watch-
maker, which Voltaire thought decisive. Without knowing the
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essence of the soul and of the body, Condillac knows that they are
two distinct substances. "The body may be defined as an ex-
tended substance, and the soul as a sentient substance. It is suffi-
cient to consider entension and sensation as two incompatible prop-
erties, to be convinced that the substance of the soul and that of
the body are too widely different substances. Locke was wrong in
declaring that it will perhaps be forever impossible for us to know
whether God has not endowed some heap of matter shaped in a
certain way with the faculty of thinking.— For the subject that
thinks must be one. Now a heap of matter is not one ; it is a multi-
tude. The soul thus being a different substance from the bod}',
we cannot understand how the latter would act upon it. The body
can be only an occasional cause. We must therefore acknowledge
that the senses are but the occasional source of our knowledge.
Free access is thus left for idealism.
There is no reason why we should question Condillac's sincer-
ity as regards his spiritualistic metaphysics ; but the very fact of
its occupying so small a place in his system, and being so closely
connected with it, is characteristic. It means that psychology was
beginning to live an independent life and trying to rely solely on
observation and experience. Locke had shown the way ; Condil-
lac advanced farther. True, his solutions are still far from perfect.
He gives bad definitions of the terms he uses, and commentators
in our days are not of one mind as to what he understands by
" sensation," "perception," and "nature." No doubt, when he
tries to analyze facts, to discover their origin, and to trace back
their genesis, he most often construes them with the aid of factors
in themselves very complex. Nevertheless he has a precise concep
tion of empirical psychology, and attempts to study the especial
share of each of the senses in our knowledge, to analyze habit and
instinct, to define the function of the association of ideas, and, in
short, to discover the genesis of psychological phenomena. All
these points were to be taken up again later on, in accordance with
a more prudent and safer method ; but at last the questions had
been raised, and often with remarkable clearness and pertinency,
so that the influence of Condillac upon French thought was long-
lived and persistent, and it would not be impossible to find traces
of it in what is taught today in our schools.
